Albanese’s Victory and the India–Australia Partnership: Strategic Alignment Amid Structural Asymmetries

Written By Dr Hugh Tuckfield

Indian PM Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Anthony Albanese, at an India-Australia Test Match

The re-election of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has been broadly welcomed in New Delhi, with Indian leaders expressing a desire for continuity and closer engagement.[1] The diplomatic mood music remains upbeat, and the language of strategic partnership flows easily from both sides. Yet beneath the surface, the India–Australia relationship is characterised by persistent asymmetries, constrained ambition, and unresolved tensions that limit the depth of bilateral cooperation.[2]

At the Indo-Pacific Studies Center we view this not as a reason for pessimism but as a moment that calls for clear-eyed assessment. If the partnership is to move beyond rhetoric, both sides must engage with the structural realities that underpin and sometimes undermine the relationship that on every metric deserves a much greater allocation of attention and resources. There is a need for greater focus on security, economics and trade, people-to-people ties, and normative convergence.

Continuity Without Strategic Depth

While political support for India in Australia is genuinely bipartisan, this consensus has not translated into a robust institutional foundation. Dialogue mechanisms exist, from the 2+2 Ministerial meetings to frameworks like the India Economic Strategy to 2035, but these have largely remained consultative.[3] There is little that binds the two countries in terms of treaty-level commitments or irreversible shared obligations.[4] Compared to Australia’s partnerships with the United States or Japan, the India relationship remains light on infrastructure and heavy on aspiration.[5]

There is also a reactive quality inherent within much of the bilateral engagement. Strategic cooperation has been driven as much by China’s assertiveness and aggression in the Indo-Pacific as by any shared Indo-Pacific vision.[6] Australia’s strategic response is rooted in alliance frameworks like AUKUS and ANZUS, while India continues to pursue strategic autonomy, hedging its bets across multiple poles.[7] This divergence is frequently papered over but the phenomenon remains central to understanding the limits and constraints on any meaningful convergence of interests.

The Economic Relationship: Still Underweight

The economic side of the relationship continues to underperform. Despite the fanfare around the IndAus ECTA, bilateral trade remains modest.[8] India is not among Australia’s top trading partners, and Australian investors still struggle to navigate India’s complex regulatory environment, its protectionist impulses and barriers, and often time unpredictable policy shifts.[9] Key areas of potential including critical minerals, renewable energy, education, and digital infrastructure-remain underexploited.[10] This asymmetry in commercial orientation continues to hold back a deeper economic partnership.[11]

Security Cooperation: Vitally Important but Incomplete

In the security domain there is genuine progress, particularly in maritime cooperation and military to military exercises. But here too, we observe limitations and hindered progress. India’s absence from AUKUS is not simply a matter of capacity, rather it reflects a deliberate choice to maintain distance from tightly integrated Western defense pacts.[12] Despite participation in the QUAD, New Delhi continues to guard its non-aligned posture, particularly in dealing with China and Russia.[13] Interoperability remains uneven, with little alignment in joint planning, logistics, or cyber defense.[14] The rhetoric around a shared Indo-Pacific vision is often strong, but the operational architecture is defiantly  opaque. Defence ties, while promising, have not yet reached the level of strategic interdependence.

People-People Ties: A Dormant Asset

The Indian diaspora in Australia is growing rapidly and represents a significant bridge between the two countries.[15] Yet diaspora engagement remains politically under-leveraged and diplomatically under-developed and the current resource allocation to engagement remains below what is needed. While Indian students make up a large share of Australia’s international education market, the two-way flows between Australia and India remain negligible.[16] Few Australian students or researchers engage with Indian institutions at scale.[17] This imbalance undermines the potential for long term societal linkages. Knowledge diplomacy cannot be one-directional. Nor can people-to-people ties remain an abstract goal. They require resourcing, frameworks and solid intent.

Normative Gaps and Unspoken Frictions

Despite the frequent invocation of “shared values” normative divergences continue to widen. Australia has adopted sharper public stances on issues such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Gaza conflict, while India has chosen strategic ambiguity.[18] These differences are often glossed over for the sake of unity, but they reflect deeper philosophical divides about sovereignty, global governance, and what constitutes as moral leadership. Canberra has also chosen not to comment publicly on democratic backsliding in India.[19] While this silence may reflect strategic caution, it undermines the credibility of the partnership as based on democratic values.

Conclusion: Eyes Open, Not Just Arms Open

The case for a deeper India-Australia partnership remains compelling. Geographically shared strategic interests and converging concerns over regional stability provide a strong foundation. But this relationship will not grow under a new Albanese government through rhetorical affirmations alone and a game of cricket. If both countries are to move from symbolic engagement to substantive strategy, they must acknowledge the constraints: economic, institutional and normative that continue to limit what is possible. That means addressing asymmetries, accepting differences and designing cooperation that is both realistic and resilient. Continuity in Canberra may reassure Delhi, but reassurance does not constitute strategy. The real test now is whether the partnership can evolve beyond potential and transform into performance.

Endnotes

[1] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2023). Joint statement - 1st Australia-India Annual Summit. Australian Government. https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-1st-australia-india-annual-summit

[2] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2024). Joint statement: 2nd India-Australia Annual Summit. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F38547%2FJoint+Statement+2nd+IndiaAustralia+Annual+Summit

[3] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2023, November). Joint statement: Second Australia-India 2+2 ministerial dialogue, New Delhi. Australian Government. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/joint-statement-second-australia-india-22-ministerial-dialogue-new-delhi

 [4] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2020). Joint statement on a comprehensive strategic partnership between the Republic of India and Australia. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/joint-statement-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-between-republic-india-and-australia

 [5] Zhang, F., & Smith, J. (2022). The evolution of the 'QUAD': driving forces, impacts, and prospects. Asia-Pacific Journal of International Affairs, 12(4), 345-367. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9734955/

 [6] Tzinieris, S., & Bowen, W. (2024). What AUKUS means to Britain: Appraising the benefits and challenges in an election year. Security and Defence PLuS Collected Essays. https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/essays/what-aukus-means-to-britain/

 [7] Department of Defence. (2025, March 18). 9th Australia-India Defence Policy Talks. Australian Government. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2025-03-18/9th-australia-india-defence-policy-talks

 [8] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). India - Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA). Australian Government. https://edit.wti.org/document/show/a469b271-e3a5-410f-a57c-0b24cd4e48f3

 [9] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). Australia’s Indian diaspora: A national asset. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias_indian_diaspora_220317_full_report.pdf

 [10] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). India - Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA). Australian Government. https://edit.wti.org/document/show/a469b271-e3a5-410f-a57c-0b24cd4e48f3

 [11] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). Australia’s Indian diaspora: A national asset. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias_indian_diaspora_220317_full_report.pdf

 [12] Tzinieris, S., & Bowen, W. (2024). What AUKUS means to Britain: Appraising the benefits and challenges in an election year. Security and Defence PLuS Collected Essays. https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/essays/what-aukus-means-to-britain/

 [13] Zhang, F., & Smith, J. (2022). The evolution of the 'QUAD': driving forces, impacts, and prospects. Asia-Pacific Journal of International Affairs, 12(4), 345-367. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9734955/

 [14] Department of Defence. (2025, March 18). 9th Australia-India Defence Policy Talks. Australian Government. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2025-03-18/9th-australia-india-defence-policy-talks

 [15] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). Australia’s Indian diaspora: A national asset. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias_indian_diaspora_220317_full_report.pdf

 [16] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). Australia’s Indian diaspora: A national asset. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias_indian_diaspora_220317_full_report.pdf

 [17] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). Australia’s Indian diaspora: A national asset. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias_indian_diaspora_220317_full_report.pdf

 [18] Australian Government. (2022). Australian Government response to inquiry into support for Ukraine. https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/australian-government-response-to-inquiry-into-support-for-ukraine/introduction; Yeola, K., & Bandyopadhyay, S. (2025, January 13). Breaking the silence: India’s need for assertive foreign policy in a polarized world. Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/01/13/breaking-the-silence-indias-need-for-assertive-foreign-policy-in-a-polarized-world/

 [19] Human Rights Watch. (2024). World report 2024: Australia. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/australia

 

Dr Hugh Tuckfield

Hugh Tuckfield is a political theorist and human rights lawyer with a career that spans academia, law, and international consultancy. Hugh's academic journey began at Monash University, where he earned degrees in Economics and Law. He further expanded his knowledge with a Master of Human Rights and Democratization (Asia-Pacific Region) from the University of Sydney and the Kathmandu School of Law. His commitment to research led him to complete his doctoral thesis at the University of Sydney in the Department of Government and International Relations. He has held positions as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, a WZB Sydney University Merit Fellow at the WZB Social Science Center in Berlin, and an associate of the Sydney Asia Pacific Migration Center. These roles have allowed him to engage in innovative research and collaboration with fellow scholars. , Hugh has lectured at the University of Sydney and the Kathmandu School of Law on subjects such as international human rights, research methods, and the regional and global governance of migration. His teaching reflects his passion for knowledge-sharing and mentorship.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/hughtuckfield/
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