The Indo-Pacific Defense Pact That Won’t Be: Security Without a Signature

Summary

As geopolitical tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific, some analysts have called for the creation of a formal "Pacific Defense Pact," modeled loosely on NATO, to deter Chinese assertiveness. However, such a proposal misreads regional dynamics and mislabels the strategic geography. The Indo-Pacific—not simply the Pacific—is the true theater of strategic importance. The region’s political diversity and diplomatic history renders a treaty-based alliance both impractical and strategically risky.

This IPSC Commentary argues that the idea of a formal defense pact is both misnamed and mistimed. Drawing on IPSC research on the concept of an Indo-Pacific Treaty Organisation (IPTO), which found broad regional resistance to NATO-style defense architecture, we show why India will not join a formal alliance, why informality remains a strategic asset, and what a smarter, more functional alternative might look like for ensuring regional stability.

Introduction: The Misnamed Moment

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner has advocated for a “Pacific Defense Pact” to formalize deterrence against China. But the term itself is problematic. The Indo-Pacific—stretching from East Africa to the Western Pacific—encompasses far more than the Pacific Rim alone. Moreover, the idea of transplanting a NATO-style collective defense model into Asia overlooks the complex realities of sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and threat perceptions in the region.

Instead, the central question to consider is whether a formal Indo-Pacific defense pact would fill a genuine strategic gap or whether it risks undermining the very stability it seeks to ensure.

Evaluating the Proposal

My assessment of a formal Indo-Pacific defense pact reflects converging insights from across the Indo-Pacific strategic community, including policy experts, security practitioners, and regional analysts. Ratner seems to rely on a single doctrinal view: that only a formal, treaty-based collective defense pact, modeled on NATO, can credibly deter Chinese aggression in the Pacific. In doing so, Ratner fails to synthesize perspectives shaped by a shared understanding of the region's political diversity, strategic pragmatism, and evolving security partnerships.

Rather than seeking to impose a treaty framework, the Indo-Pacific is already experimenting with adaptable models of security cooperation. The Quad has enabled strategic coordination on maritime security, infrastructure, and critical technologies without treaty obligations, and AUKUS has created a framework for deep defense integration among a smaller group. These arrangements reflect the logic of functional alignment over formal alliances and suggest that the region is moving organically toward a distributed security network, not a single bloc.

Criticism of the defense pact proposal has also come from within the region. The recent article by Bec Strating, titled The Wrong Time for a Collective Defence Pact in Asia, argues that the timing and structure of a collective defense pact are misaligned with the region’s political and strategic realities. Strating rightly highlights the divergent threat perceptions, competing national interests, and ASEAN’s commitment to non-alignment as major obstacles to a formal alliance. Her analysis reinforces the argument that the Indo-Pacific's security needs are better served through pragmatic, flexible, and informal arrangements.

In contrast, Ratner envisions a formalized defense pact between the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, potentially expandable to other regional partners. He argues that only legal commitments between member states can credibly deter Chinese military aggression, particularly regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. Arguing only legal commitments reflects a rigid ideological framework rooted in Cold War-style alliance logic.

Ratner contends that existing informal arrangements, like the Quad or bilateral partnerships, lack the credibility to deter China. He asserts that only a formal, treaty-based defense pact can do so. I am not sure that the People’s Republic of China (PRC), or Xi Jing Ping are overly concerned about the presence or absence of formal instruments underlying AUKUS and Quad. The PRC, including under Xi Jinping’s leadership, does not necessarily calibrate its actions based on the legal formalism of alliances. Rather, its strategic calculus is shaped by perceived capability, cohesion, and intent, regardless of whether arrangements are treaty-bound.

Ratner’s proposal rests on a legalist-determinist ideology: the belief that formal treaties and mutual defense clauses are both necessary and sufficient for regional stability. Necessity and sufficiency are important terms; they are foundational terms in logic and reasoning. Necessity implies that without a legal treaty, deterrence is not possible. This treats formal defense pacts as a prerequisite for peace and stability.

Sufficiency suggests that if such a treaty exists, then deterrence will be automatically effective. In this logic, legal obligation alone is enough to generate security outcomes—irrespective of context, credibility, or capability.

Yet the Indo-Pacific already hosts a dense web of strategic coordination. Frameworks including the Quad, AUKUS, and multiple bilateral agreements offer extensive security engagement without formal obligations. These arrangements, while informal, allow for adaptability, political feasibility, and regional legitimacy—qualities that a treaty-based pact may lack.

Friction and Opportunity

Several factors complicate the formation of a formal defense pact in the Indo-Pacific. Politically, many regional states, particularly India and members of ASEAN, are deeply committed to maintaining strategic autonomy. Sovereignty concerns and a historical resistance to binding alliances make treaty-based commitments politically infeasible.

Economically, most Indo-Pacific states maintain substantial trade and energy relationships with China. These dependencies complicate alliance calculus and make confrontation with Beijing a costly proposition.

Socially, domestic political climates vary widely across the region. Public skepticism about foreign entanglements is strong, especially where there is fear of being dragged into conflicts involving great powers.

Technologically, wide disparities in defense readiness and capability exist. Many states in the region lack the interoperability and shared platforms necessary for an integrated alliance.

Environmentally, shared interests such as maritime security, climate resilience, and disaster response present opportunities for cooperation. These areas are less politically sensitive and could serve as low-risk confidence-building measures.

Legally, there is no precedent or appetite for a multilateral defense treaty in Asia. ASEAN norms explicitly discourage military blocs, and regional consensus favors inclusive, dialogue-based mechanisms.

India’s Reluctant Posture: Aligned, Not Allied

India is a critical actor in the Indo-Pacific security landscape, but we already know it is unlikely to join any formal defense pact. Its strategic culture, rooted in non-alignment and sovereignty, strongly resists binding military alliances. India values its ability to navigate between global power centers, including the United States and Russia, and avoids formal obligations that might compromise this flexibility.

Despite this, India continues to deepen operational and strategic ties through existing arrangements. It participates in the Quad, engages in naval exercises like MALABAR, and maintains logistics and defense agreements with several key partners. India sees China as a long-term strategic challenge, particularly along their shared border, but prefers to manage these tensions bilaterally.

There is broad consensus among regional analysts that India will lead from within flexible coalitions, but not from within a formal alliance framework.

Strategic Futures

Looking ahead, three broad strategic trajectories can be envisaged. One path involves the establishment of a formal defense pact, which gains credibility in some circles but ultimately fails to bring in key players like India or Southeast Asia, thereby limiting its effectiveness.

Another scenario involves a “hollow pact,” formed under political pressure but lacking internal cohesion or real operational capacity. Such an arrangement is likely to falter under the strain of crisis.

The most viable path is one of flexible alignment. This model would expand and deepen existing arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS through coordinated planning, joint exercises, and technological cooperation without formal mutual defense obligations. India, in particular, thrives in such a format, enabling it to lead on shared priorities while preserving its strategic independence.

Charting a Smarter Security Architecture

Given the region’s diversity and sensitivity, the Indo-Pacific does not need a replica of NATO. Instead, policymakers should:

• Avoid promoting formal treaty-based models ill-suited to the regional context.

• Expand modular, issue-based groups focused on cybersecurity, maritime stability, and health preparedness.

• Strengthen interoperability through joint exercises, information sharing, and technology collaboration.

• Encourage India's leadership and participation through non-binding, trust-based forums that align with its strategic culture.

Security Without a Signature

The call for a Pacific, or Indo-Pacific, defense pact underestimates the political complexity of the region and overestimates the appeal of formal alliance structures. What the Indo-Pacific needs is not a single treaty but a web of strategic partnerships that can adapt to evolving threats. A more agile and sustainable path lies in functional cooperation, minilateral diplomacy, and deterrence mechanisms tailored to regional realities.

India will not sign a defense pact—but it will shape the Indo-Pacific’s future security order through quiet leadership, strategic restraint, and smart alignment. The Indo-Pacific needs security, not signatures.