Taiwan recall election results’ impact on national security
The failure of the ‘Great Recall’ votes on July 24th and August 23rd means the 31 Kuomintang (KMT) legislators proposed will retain their seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY), and the continuation of a divided Taiwanese government. This will have a detrimental impact on Taiwan’s national security stance and requires a renewed Democratic People’s Party (DPP) strategy to ensure upcoming election success and bolster Taiwan’s defence.
Background
Following a controversial attempt by KMT legislators to reform the legislative powers, which would have shifted power to the LY and increased unregulated oversight on the Executive Yuan (EY), civic groups organised the ‘Bluebird Movement’ in opposition. This triggered a recall election to remove key KMT legislators and open their seats for re-election. The DPP eventually backed the movement alongside cross-party groups such as the ‘True Blue Army’. Despite significant support and campaigning for the recall votes, in many cases, voters failed to the meet the two requirements needed to pass the ballot. Many Taiwanese people desired a maintenance of the 2024 general election status quo, whilst further support from strong KMT grassroots networks led to overwhelming opposition to the recalls. Therefore, there was a failure to meet minimum thresholds and expel the proposed legislators.
Impact on National Security
The results suggest that the electorate still desires a balance of power in government after eight years of DPP dominance in the EY and LY and is also strongly in favour of maintaining the current makeup of government. However, it also means a continuation of KMT opposition to the DPP’s attempts to strengthen its defensive posture. For example, KMT calls for the annulment of the ‘Anti-Infiltration Act’, which specifically targets members of Beijing’s United Front or cutting NT$150 billion (approximately US$4.95 billion) from Taiwan’s defence budget. Moreover, the KMT has recently been aligning more closely with Beijing. In April 2024, Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office welcomed a group of KMT legislators (representing a third of KMT officials in the LY). However, KMT members failed to disclose the full details of their meetings. Beijing’s ties with the KMT, rooted in the ‘1992 consensus’ undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence. In addition, this corresponds with Beijing’s unification narrative and contributes to weakening Taiwanese resilience. Also of importance are the regional ramifications of the result. The USA, Taiwan’s most important ally, has already weakened its rhetoric in support of Taiwan. If its regional allies, including Japan and the Philippines, believe a Taiwanese government would be quickly undermined or capitulate to Chinese aggression, they would be more inclined to withdraw both public and materiel support. The DPP has a continuing competition with KMT to maintain a strong deterrent posture and ensure Taiwan is prepared for conflict.
A renewed DPP is required to build public support, win elections and bolster national defence
Since March 2025, public sentiment has shifted. The DPP’s net favourability dropped by about 4%, which was compounded by a positive shift of around 10% for the KMT, from a negative to a neutral feeling. This suggests the DPP are losing the centre ground regarding public perception. To recover, they must refresh their image, regain public trust and boost Taiwan’s defence. This begins by addressing domestic issues including housing, unemployment and energy security, which the DPP have failed to address.
Furthermore, on cross-strait relations they must shift from fear-based messaging to a focus on deterrence and diplomacy. Alternatively, they should build a united national defence strategy through cooperation with the LY, strengthen the economy and reinforce the people’s resilience. Equally important is to avoid partisan politics against the KMT. By improving the lives of Taiwanese citizens, they can blunt the Taiwan People’s Party’s appeal, win back voters and restore the electorate’s trust and confidence. If the DPP can recognise this recall result as a defeat and use it to rebuild its identity, they can target a victory in the 2026 local elections and establish a majority in the 2028 national elections. A strong mandate would limit the KMT’s influence and position Taiwan toward a more credible defence posture.