South Korea’s Pragmatism Foreign Policy Needs Audacity in New Geopolitics
(First published July 2025)
Democratic Party’s (DP) presidential candidate Lee Jae Myung secured a decisive victory over Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party (PPP) during the June 3rd snap presidential election. This election followed by the impeachment of a former president Yoon Suk Yeol due to an unlawful declaration of martial law. According to South Korea’s National Election Commission, Lee garnered 49.4 percent of the vote, while Kim received 41.2 percent. As the new president of South Korea started its term, many are deeply looking into what President Lee’s foreign policy will look like.
Doubling Down on Pragmatism and National Interest
President Lee Jae-myung’s foreign policy represents a carefully calibrated approach to navigating complex geopolitical realities in Northeast Asia. Taking office amid intensifying strategic competition, Lee’s foreign policy vision will be deeply rooted in pragmatism and national interest, signaling a nuanced departure from the more ideologically value-driven approaches of the previous administration.
The U.S.-ROK alliance will still remain strong under Lee’s administration. He views this partnership as a cornerstone of South Korea’s strategic stability, particularly in addressing North Korean provocations and broader regional uncertainties. He has repeatedly stressed during his presidential campaign that the U.S.-ROK alliance is the foundation of its foreign policy and continued to prove this “right-click” policies by highlighting his urge to sustain the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral framework. In regards to Trump’s trade policies and tariff negotiations, he has also geared towards “national interest first” negotiations and calculated patience, seeking more favorable terms to South Korea through careful engagement rather than immediate confrontation.
Regarding North Korea, Lee pursues a delicate balance between engagement and deterrence. His administration emphasizes reopening dialogue channels, reflecting an understanding that lasting peace can only be achieved through sustained communication. The appointment of former Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok, a proponent of diplomatic dialogue, as the head of the National Intelligence Service underscores Lee’s determination to revive inter-Korean exchanges. Yet, this engagement strategy is anchored by an unwavering commitment to military preparedness in close cooperation with the United States, ensuring that diplomatic overtures do not undermine national security.
Lee’s China policy embodies a pragmatic balancing act, navigating the complexities of economic interdependence and security concerns. Contrary to earlier perceptions of Lee favoring Beijing, his recent statements emphasize neutrality and flexibility, suggesting strategic ambiguity designed to prevent overdependence on any single great power. He stated before that it is improtant not to ignore South Korea’s relationship with China and Russia, questioning the need for antagonizing the two nations that the United States considers as its strategic challenge. This approach reflects an acute awareness of the pitfalls of aligning too closely with either Washington or Beijing, thereby safeguarding South Korea’s diplomatic autonomy and decreasing the predecessor’s value-based diplomacy.
A two-track approach will influence relations with Japan under Lee, demonstrating a renewed commitment to regional cooperation, but also showing a strong stance on ROK-Japan historical tensions. By prioritizing trilateral coordination among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, Lee’s administration will try to foster stronger security and economic partnerships. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Lee’s recent phone call for a coherent and stable ROK-Japan relations indicates potential for improved bilateral ties, addressing historical tensions pragmatically and collaboratively.
Overall, President Lee’s foreign policy outlook emphasizes strategic pragmatism and ambiguity, grounded in a nuanced understanding of regional dynamics. His approach seeks to balance diplomatic engagement with strong security alliances, pragmatic economic negotiations, and careful management of relationships with major powers, positioning South Korea as a stable and active player in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.
Foreseeable Friction and Dilemmas under Lee
However, the economic and security dimensions of the U.S-ROK alliance arise as major friction points. Lee’s immediate test involves managing trade frictions with the U.S., specifically addressing tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTB) by July. Washington's deadline looms large as Washington slapped reciprocal 26% tariffs on South Korean goods on April, while doubling steel and aluminum tariffs to 50% few days ago if no deal was reached. Lee’s “national interest first” stance suggests a strategy of calculated patience – a “wait and see” strategy - , hoping to secure concessions without alienating the U.S. or triggering Chinese backlash, given Beijing’s explicit warnings against trade agreements detrimental to its interests. However, with the Lee administration just initiating a nomination of its cabinet members, it is questionable whether the new administration will have ample time to discuss ways of alleviating NTBs, address automobile and steel tariffs, and agree with a package deal by July. Both countries will possibly experience a new area of friction, with cautious Seoul asking for a deadline extension and with Washington rushing for more trade agreement accomplishments.
Security-wise, Taiwan and North Korea policies will bring potential areas of friction between Washington and Seoul. The evolving role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) presents a sensitive dilemma, especially regarding potential involvement in a Taiwan contingency. Pentagon leaders under President Trump have made it “abundantly clear” that U.S. forces abroad considered crucial for contesting China, especially preventing any forcible seizure of Taiwan. Washington's push for broader USFK regional responsibilities will place Seoul in a difficult position, caught between avoiding entrapment in conflicts beyond the peninsula and fears of strategic abandonment.
Lee’s nuanced approach to Taiwan further complicates relations with both China and the U.S. This was evident during Lee’s presidential campaign when he stated that South Korea should say “xie xie to China and xie xie to Taiwan,” meaning that the Taiwan Strait issue is not a strategic priority to South Korea. While he advocates for neutrality and careful hedging, escalating geopolitical dynamics between the U.S. and China could soon force Seoul into difficult choices. Lee will have to confront pressures from both Washington and Beijing, as Washington will ask, “How can South Korea contribute to U.S.’s plan of countering China?” while Beijing will continuously pressure South Korea not to align closely with the U.S.’s economic and security plans. As Lee showed reluctance to expanding USFK’s mandate and interfering in the Taiwan crisis, the U.S. and South Korea is bound for more complicated frictions and dilemmas.
Another significant friction point likely to emerge involves diverging priorities between Seoul and Washington regarding North Korea policy. While South Korea under Lee Jae-myung might seek pragmatic engagement with Pyongyang to ensure regional stability and advance inter-Korean relations aligning with Trump’s “bromance” with Kim Jong-Un, the U.S. could pursue negotiations narrowly tailored to American national security objectives. CSIS President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department Victor Cha warned in his recent article in Foreign Affairs about potential U.S. concessions to curb North Korea’s weapons programs, particularly those that threaten the American homeland—including long-range missiles. He outlines how Trump’s “America First” prism emphasizes preventing ICBM advancements even when South Korea and regional allies are more concerned about regional short- and medium-range systems. This raises concerns of potential "Korea passing," wherein Washington engages directly with Pyongyang, sidelining Seoul’s strategic interests. For instance, during the Trump administration’s 2018 Singapore Summit with Kim Jong-un, Seoul was largely excluded from substantive talks, leaving the former Moon Jae-in government scrambling to maintain influence and manage domestic expectations. Such an approach risks weakening South Korea’s diplomatic leverage, complicating unified responses to North Korean provocations, and possibly marginalizing Seoul in critical security decisions.
A Need for Bold Diplomacy and Strategic Minilateralism
South Korea’s investment deliberations on strategic industrial bases for potential cooperation with the United States will enable South Korea to gain more leverage in trade negotiations, aligning with Lee’s “national interest-based” foreign policy. Investments in shipyards, defense industrial bases, and ICT R&D would accelerate the modernization of U.S.-ROK’s core military capabilities while reinforcing maintenance-repair-overhaul (MRO) sectors for both navy and airforce. The Lee administration will have to offer its shipyards and aerospace centers as indispensable hubs for the U.S. and across the Indo-Pacific as a way to gain strategic leverage during the negotiations. Parallel cooperation—such as collaborative project on Golden Dome architecture with Korean companies like Hanwha Aerospace or LiG Nex1 and equity participation in the revitalised Alaska LNG pipeline—would reinforce missile defense technologies, energy security, and supply-chain interdependence with the United States at a time when Beijing is weaponizing both commodities and geography amidst the U.S.-China competition.
These resources, however, must be coupled with institutional leverage. Seoul should employ the newly established U.S.–ROK Regional Cooperation Working Group to create a permanent Consultative Group on Taiwan, modelled on the Nuclear Consultative Group, thereby securing a formal role in contingency planning and guiding principles for USFK strategic flexibility before a crisis dictates outcomes. Passively waiting for the U.S. to discuss this matter will not solve a dilemma. Simutaneously, the Lee administration can consider creating a direct hotline with Beijing as a way to communicate actively about the Taiwan strait issue and North Korea’s denuclearization. This will allow Seoul to bolster its strategic balance while reducing chances of unintentional conflict due to mixed signals.
Finally, the Lee administration should actively utilize minilaterals to achieve its goal as an active global state and diversify its markets. It should continue engaging with like-minded middle powers like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and ASEAN through ASEAN-plus forums, NATO’s IP4, G20 and actively negotiate in joining multilateral trade blocs like the CPTPP. Although the Lee administration’s decision to participate in the NATO summit is undecided, they should recognize that North Korea issue is no longer a peninsular issue after its troop deployment in the Ukraine War. By participating in various minilaterals and blocs, South Korea can advance from the constraints of a “shrimp among whales” to the stature of an indispensable middle power whose voice is calculated into every U.S.–China risk assessment in the region.
While the new administration starts guiding South Korea with a new foreign policy, South Korea is in the middle of an epoch of unprecedented geopolitical complexities in the Indo-Pacific: Trump’s America-first policies, U.S.-China strategic rivalry, and DPRK-Russia cooperation in the Ukraine war. President Lee will have to confront these multiple geopolitical realities and should realize that Korea must not be caught reading the old playbook of diplomacy as the world rewrites the new playbook. This is an opportune moment for the liberal administration to borrow both liberal and conservative foreign-policy approaches that traditional DP leaderships have often neglected, thereby advancing the nation’s interests through a strategy that is pragmatic but bold.
SeungHwan (Shane) Kim is currently a nonresident fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center. He is also an Emerging Leader in Diplomacy and National Security at the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His previous experiences include roles at the Korea Foundation USA, East-West Center, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, the Korea Economic Institute, the Korea Studies Institute, and the ROK National Assembly. He holds an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. from the University of Southern California. This article represents the author’s personal views and does not represent the Korean government.