BRICS Under Stress: Venezuela, Iran, and the Implications for Indo-Pacific Energy and Security

5 Jan

BRICS’ First Major Stress Test in the Indo-Pacific

The first major test of an expanded BRICS is the United States' arrest of President Maduro of Venezuela and the growing unrest in Iran.

Regime change in Venezuela and the imminent prospect of regime change in Iran weaken the energy-and-sanctions alliance that Russia, Iran, China, and potential partners such as Venezuela had been constructing.

The ability of BRICS to provide Indo-Pacific nations with a dependable short-term substitute for Western banking and energy systems will be limited as a result of these developments.

Simultaneously, a risk-tolerant United States within its own hemisphere, contrasted with ongoing caution in the Indo-Pacific, heightens the motivations for Indo-Pacific middle powers to hedge: strengthen security relations with Washington, selectively engage with BRICS for markets and influence, and accelerate efforts to diversify energy sources and maritime interests ahead of the next systemic shock.

Energy, Sanctions, and the Limits of BRICS Cohesion

BRICS members collectively represent a significant and increasing proportion of global crude supply and demand, with China, India, and now Indonesia playing a pivotal role in Indo-Pacific flows.

Any actions by the U.S. that change the direction of Venezuelan shipments and raise risks for Iranian exports will affect pricing and supply options for Indo-Pacific buyers, who have been relying on cheaper Russian and Iranian crude to deal with G7 sanctions.

Great-power signaling and middle-power hedging

The Venezuela operation also sends a sharp signal into the Indo-Pacific strategic environment: the United States, while cautious about large-scale war with China, is again prepared to use force and extraterritorial law enforcement in its near abroad to enforce red lines and sanctions.

Russia, China, and Iran have condemned the strikes as illegal and hegemonic, but their inability to shield a partner regime undercuts BRICS rhetoric about a robust counterweight to Western coercion.

For Indo-Pacific middle powers, such an incident reinforces the logic of hedging rather than alignment. BRICS now looks less like a cohesive anti‑Western bloc and more like a heterogeneous forum whose most revisionist members are also among its most vulnerable.

At the same time, Washington’s willingness to act decisively in the Western Hemisphere—but more ambiguously in the Indo-Pacific—will push regional governments to deepen security and intelligence ties with the U.S. while keeping economic options open across BRICS and non‑BRICS partners alike.

Implications for Indo-Pacific Energy and Maritime Security

Maduro’s removal and increased unrest in Iran make the connection between problems in the Western Hemisphere and energy issues in the Indo-Pacific stronger, because economies in the Indo-Pacific rely heavily on oil transported by sea, which includes supplies from BRICS countries and passes through important Middle Eastern routes.

With BRICS energy cooperation weakened and important suppliers facing sanctions, Indo-Pacific nations have less bargaining power over cheaper oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, meaning they have to locate new sources, speed up the shift to cleaner energy, and protect against market instability caused by sanctions.

Any instability affecting Iran—a country located at the Strait of Hormuz—increases the risk premiums on shipping routes that directly supply Indo-Pacific markets, even as regional states invest in alternative corridors and LNG capacity.

If BRICS can't effectively collaborate on maritime security or handle energy crises, the U.S. naval power and regional groups like the Quad and India–Gulf–Europe initiatives will gain more influence, pushing middle powers to work together more on protecting shipping routes while also thinking about long-term infrastructure and energy deals with BRICS members. This development aligns with the 2025 United States NSS emphasisi on burden shifting.

Strategic questions for the Indo-Pacific policymakers

For Indo-Pacific policymakers and analysts, three questions follow:

How should regional energy strategies adjust if key BRICS suppliers (Iran and potentially Venezuela) are simultaneously destabilized and partially reabsorbed into U.S.-dominated circuits?
What does it mean for Indo-Pacific crisis management if BRICS proves unable to protect, or even stabilize, its members during major political shocks?
How can middle powers use this moment to reinforce maritime security, diversify supply chains and financial exposure, and ensure that neither U.S. coercive tools nor BRICS fragmentation translate into unmanageable volatility in the region?

Dr Hugh Tuckfield

Hugh Tuckfield is a political theorist and human rights lawyer with a career that spans academia, law, and international consultancy. Hugh's academic journey began at Monash University, where he earned degrees in Economics and Law. He further expanded his knowledge with a Master of Human Rights and Democratization (Asia-Pacific Region) from the University of Sydney and the Kathmandu School of Law. His commitment to research led him to complete his doctoral thesis at the University of Sydney in the Department of Government and International Relations. He has held positions as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, a WZB Sydney University Merit Fellow at the WZB Social Science Center in Berlin, and an associate of the Sydney Asia Pacific Migration Center. These roles have allowed him to engage in innovative research and collaboration with fellow scholars. , Hugh has lectured at the University of Sydney and the Kathmandu School of Law on subjects such as international human rights, research methods, and the regional and global governance of migration. His teaching reflects his passion for knowledge-sharing and mentorship.